







This article calls into question recent attempts to move beyond, to ‘post’ phenomenology by highlighting the
continued relevance of key phenomenological concepts (intentionality and correlationism) for human geo-
graphy. I show how these concepts are pivotal to addressing problems raised by post-phenomenologists
themselves concerning affects and objects. Drawing on recent phenomenological theory, I develop a spatial
account of how subject and object cohere in experience. I argue that the very relation between/entanglement of
the human andmore-than-/non-human canbest beaccounted for phenomenologically. Sucha phenomenological
approach promises new ways of understanding various phenomena such as landscape, weather or climate.
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I Introduction
What promise has phenomenology got left for
human geography? In what follows, I seek to
highlight how phenomenology is uniquely able
to capture an aspect of experience of particular
importance to human geography, namely how
subject and object cohere or correlate in expe-
rience. Phenomenology, I argue, casts a light on
this in between space in which subject and
object are intertwined in distinct ways. Inten-
tionality and correlationism are the phenomen-
ological concepts which enable one to account
for the structure of this entanglement. Being
able to account for the structured correlational
nature of experience gives phenomenological
accounts their explanatory and critical pur-
chase. It follows that the phenomenological
promise for human geography rests in the fact
that many phenomena of interest to human
geographers (and post-phenomenologists in
particular) are correlational in nature, that is,
they can best be understood by reflecting on
how the human and more-than-/non-human are
entangled in distinct ways.
Furthermore, clarifying this entanglement
addresses a broader question that has recently
arisen concerning the difficulty to clearly dis-
tinguish between phenomenology and post-
phenomenology in geographical discourse
(Backhaus, 2009: 143; Lea, 2009). Ash and
Simpson note that
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post-phenomenology is not about abandoning the
key insights of phenomenology. Instead it is about
refiguring and expanding phenomenology’s ana-
lytic and conceptual boundaries. It is about
exploring what Quentin Meillassoux (2009) [sic]
terms ‘the great outdoors’ – an excessive world
that lies outside of the human-environment corre-
late but which is central to shaping human capa-
cities, relations and experiences. (Ash and
Simpson, 2016: 63, emphasis mine)
Yet it is difficult to square this conciliatory
tone with the stark critique of phenomenology’s
basic concepts, such as intentionality. If ‘the
post-phenomenology emerging thus far in geo-
graphy can be taken most simply to be the
development of a phenomenology beyond
intentionality’ (Ash and Simpson, 2016: 53–
54), then what is left of phenomenology in
post-phenomenology?
It is this (perceived) gap between phenomen-
ological and post-phenomenological key con-
cepts, I believe, that has motivated critiques
by geographers such as David Seamon, who
recently raised his concern ‘about the “critical”
and “post-” labels’, namely that ‘almost every-
thing these thinkers aim to accomplish can be
readily accommodated by conventional phe-
nomenological principles, concepts, and meth-
ods’ (Seamon, 2019: 42). Similarly, Thomas
Dörfler and Eberhard Rothfuß have voiced con-
cern that ‘the relationship between experience –
knowledge – interpretation [ . . . ], which forms
the basis for all subjective and objective under-
standing of social and material matters of fact’
remains ‘completely unclear’ (Dörfler and
Rothfuß, 2018: 97, translation mine) in post-
phenomenological/post-hermeneutical theory.
Most recently, Eden Kinkaid (2020a) has
offered an excellent response to critiques raised
by post-phenomenologists in human geography
by demonstrating ‘how critical phenomenology
has developed more nuanced and critical
responses to the same problems that post-
phenomenologists have identified in classical
phenomenology’ (Kinkaid, 2020a: 2, emphasis
mine). The aim of Kinkaid’s critique of certain
aspects of post-phenomenology is to make
post-phenomenology ‘a more critical and polit-
ically self-aware geographic paradigm’ (Kin-
kaid, 2020a: 2). As Kinkaid and I discuss
different phenomenological responses to, while
sharing a number of concerns about post-
phenomenology, I believe both pieces comple-
ment each other exceptionally well.
The aim of what follows is not to adjudi-
cate the debate outlined, but rather to deliver
a phenomenological response to the larger
issues raised by post-phenomenology (for
other phenomenological responses to post-
phenomenology, see also Simonsen, 2007,
2013).
Specifically, I set out to offer an account of
how phenomenology may fulfil its promise to
human geography by first giving, in section II, a
brief definition of both intentionality and
correlationism.
I then go on, in section III, to respond to
critiques of intentionality and correlationism
raised by post-phenomenologists by demon-
strating how two of post-phenomenology’s cen-
tral aims – (i) rethinking ‘intentionality as an
emergent relation’ and (ii) recognising that
‘objects have an autonomous existence’ (Ash
and Simpson, 2016: 48) – can be accomplished
not by moving beyond intentionality, but by
recognising and accounting for the correlational
nature of experience. Following a number of
suggested post-phenomenological methodolo-
gies (Ash and Simpson, 2019), I go on to pro-
pose that phenomenology itself might be a way
of ‘doing post-phenomenology’.
Having outlined how phenomenology may
respond to recent critiques, I proceed, in section
IV, to draw on recent contributions to phenom-
enological theory in order to develop a spatial
account of how subject and object cohere or
correlate, providing a novel answer to the prob-
lem of the ‘great outdoors’.
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I conclude by reiterating wherein phenomen-
ology’s promise for human geography lies and
suggest spatial phenomenology as a particularly
novel and promising approach to understanding
the entangled nature of experience and
existence.
II Defining Intentionality and
Correlationism
At the heart of the arguments to follow are two
central phenomenological concepts – intention-
ality and correlationism – and their potential for
advancing geographical theory. So as not to
obfuscate my argument with vague jargon, I
begin by giving brief definitions of intentional-
ity and correlationism, following Dan Zahavi’s
(2018) account in his recently published intro-
duction to phenomenology.
Intentionality is a central concept for phe-
nomenology because it describes, on a founda-
tional level, the structure of consciousness. As
Zahavi explains, our conscious life is not a mere
unstructured ‘amalgam of more or less intense
internal sensations and feeling states’ (Zahavi,
2018: 16, emphasis mine). Rather, conscious-
ness – seeing, hearing, remembering, imagin-
ing, thinking, hating and so on – ‘is about
something’ (Zahavi, 2018: 16, emphasis mine).
Consciousness hence ‘has a directness to it, it is
a consciousness of something, it is characterised
by intentionality’ (Zahavi, 2018: 16, emphasis
mine). As the different ways of being conscious
mentioned above show, consciousness ‘is not
concerned or preoccupied with itself, but it is,
rather, by nature self-transcending’ (Zahavi,
2018: 16, emphasis mine). By virtue of being
about something, consciousness is always
beyond itself. Zahavi summarises that for ‘the
phenomenologist, “intentionality” is the generic
term for this pointing-beyond-itself proper to
consciousness’ (Zahavi, 2018: 16).
One might now assume that, because
phenomenology is concerned with intentional-
ity (the directness of consciousness),
phenomenologists deal with subjective experi-
ence alone, with what is going on ‘in our heads’.
But this would be a substantial (yet common and
prominent) misunderstanding of phenomenol-
ogy. Zahavi explains that phenomenologists
reject the view that ‘experiences are in and of
themselves subjective happenings with no
immediate bearing on the world outside’
(Zahavi, 2018: 20). Because consciousness is
defined by its ‘intentional openness’ and
‘world-relatedness’ (Zahavi, 2018: 24), it would
be ‘misleading to regard the world as somehow
outside or external to us’ (Zahavi, 2018: 23).
Hence, for the phenomenologist, the subjec-
tive and objective cannot be disentangled; they
are ‘systematically interrelated’ (Zahavi, 2018:
17) in intentionality. Given this entanglement,
the study of intentionality is not only necessary
in order to understand the nature of conscious-
ness, but also in order to ‘pave the way of a
proper understanding of reality and objectivity’
(Zahavi, 2018: 27). The very distinction between
epistemology (the study of how we know) and
ontology (the study of what is) is undermined by
phenomenology, because both the (subjective)
act of knowing and the (objective) reality of what
is are intertwined in intentionality (Zahavi, 2018:
27). Hence for the phenomenologist, the idea that
what ‘things really are’
is something completely divorced from any con-
text of use, network of meaning, or theoretical
framework, and that whatever experiential and
theoretical perspective we might adopt on them
is consequently bound to miss its target, is not
only a deeply obfuscating claim, but also one that
is epistemologically naive. On what basis and
from what perspective could such a claim ever
be justified? We cannot look sideways at our
experiences in order to see to what extent they
match with reality. This is so, not because such
a view is extremely hard to reach, but because the
very idea of such a view is nonsensical. Any
understanding of reality is by definition perspec-
tival. Effacing our perspective does not bring us
any closer to the world. It merely prevents us from
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understanding anything about the world at all.
(Zahavi, 2018: 28, emphasis mine)
Understanding the systematic interrelation of
subject and object in experience thus means to
understand how our perspectival understand-
ing of reality takes shape. The ‘aim of the phe-
nomenological analysis’ is hence ‘not to
investigate either the object or the subject,
either the world or the mind, but to investigate
their interrelation or correlation’ (Zahavi,
2018: 34, emphasis mine).
Much of the conceptual work behind under-
standing correlationism is already done in under-
standing intentionality. Correlationism is simply
‘the view that subjectivity and objectivity cannot
be understood or analysed apart from one another
because both are intertwined and internally
related’ (Zahavi, 2017: 174). Hence correlationism
is an epistemologically modest philosophical posi-
tion: instead of making claims ‘about that which
transcends us, [ . . . ] correlationism might be a way
of acknowledging the finite and perspectival char-
acter of our knowledge’ (Zahavi, 2016: 301).
Before I turn to post-phenomenological cri-
tiques of intentionality and correlationism, it is
important to emphasise why we, as human geo-
graphers, should be interested in this fairly tech-
nical discussion. As I aim to show through the
examples below, many phenomena of interest to
human geographers (and post-phenomenologists
in particular) take place in this space between
subject and object; they are, as I argue, inherently
correlational, that is, they cannot simply be
reduced to subjectivity or objectivity, but rather
correlate subjects and objects in distinctive ways.
Erasing the correlational and hence entangled
nature of these phenomena would risk obfuscat-
ing their very nature.
III Post-Phenomenology:
Overcoming Correlationism?
The critique of intentionality is central to post-
phenomenology in that it constitutes a ‘major
point of cohesion’ between different post-
phenomenological approaches which otherwise
‘emerge from a variety of intellectual traditions
and in many cases utilize different onto-
epistemological assumptions about the world
that by no means fully coincide’ (Ash and Simp-
son, 2016: 62). In spite of their differences, said
approaches share a ‘commitment to overcoming
the human-world, subject-object correlate and,
in doing so, unsettling the intentional correlate
of experience’ (Ash and Simpson, 2016: 62,
emphasis mine).1
This point of cohesion detailed by Ash and
Simpson brings to light a further central concept
that is critiqued by post-phenomenology: corre-
lationism. Phenomenology’s correlationism has
most prominently been called into question by
Quentin Meillassoux in his book After Finitude,
where he defines correlationism as
the idea according to which we only ever have
access to the correlation between thinking and
being, and never to either term considered apart
from the other. We will henceforth call correla-
tionism any current of thought which maintains
the unsurpassable character of the correlation so
defined. (Meillassoux, 2008 [2006]: 5)
The allure of post-phenomenological inquiry
and its critique of correlationism and intention-
ality is hence to break free from this ‘correla-
tionist circle’ (Meillassoux, 2008 [2006]: 5), ‘to
access a great outdoors’ (Meillassoux, 2008
[2006]: 50), ‘a behind-the-scenes world’
(Zahavi, 2018: 14), ‘an excessive world that lies
outside of the human-environment correlate but
which is central to shaping human capacities,
relations and experiences’ (Ash and Simpson,
2016: 63). This, I argue, is true not only of
post-phenomenology as it is discussed and fur-
ther developed by Ash and Simpson, but of
post-phenomenology more broadly: Post-
phenomenology is defined by overcoming cor-
relationism, one way or another.
Overcoming correlationism faces two key
challenges: (i) How do we break free from the
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constraints of intentionality and correlationism?
(ii) Having ‘broken free’, how do we account
for how the ‘excessive world that lies outside’
shapes ‘human capacities, relations and experi-
ences’ (Ash and Simpson, 2016: 63), when
these human capacities, relations and experi-
ences are themselves characterised by intention-
ality? For the phenomenologist, as I outlined
above, breaking free from such constraints is
impossible because they are what make any
meaningful understanding of reality possible.
In what follows in this section, I will answer
to these challenges by showing how phenomen-
ology can (i) rethink ‘intentionality as an emer-
gent relation’ through affectivity and (ii)
recognise that ‘objects have an autonomous
existence’ (Ash and Simpson, 2016: 48) without
abandoning intentionality and correlationism.
In fact, as I aim to show through my discussion
of (i) affects and (ii) objects, correlationism is
central to understanding how both shape human
capacities, relations and experiences. Finally, I
suggest that (iii) phenomenology might be a
way of doing what post-phenomenology seeks
to accomplish.
1 Affects (and Intentionality as an Emergent
Relation)
In order to highlight what is at stake in post-
phenomenological critiques of intentionality
and correlationism, I first focus on one of the
possible ways to break free from the ‘correla-
tional circle’ identified by Ash and Simpson:
affectivity (Ash and Simpson, 2016: 55). Draw-
ing on Michel Henry’s phenomenology of life,
Ash and Simpson argue that the ‘primary
affectivity in all appearing precedes, and so lays
the ground for, any sort of appearance to
intentionality’ (Ash and Simpson, 2016: 55,
emphasis mine). Consequently, for ‘the post-
phenomenologist, appearance comes before
intentionality’ (Ash and Simpson, 2016: 55).
As others have argued, Henry’s concept of
affectivity as ‘auto-impression’ (Henry, 2008
[1990]: 26) cannot be about anything in partic-
ular, since aboutness presupposes intentionality
(Harding, 2012: 96).
As Henry himself notes, in this ‘entirely new
terrain’ of affectivity there simply ‘are no lon-
ger any objects’ (Henry, 2008 [1990]: 48) which
an affect could be about. For Henry, affectivity
is ‘an absolutely self-sufficient, non-ecstatic,
irrelational self-manifestation’ (Zahavi, 1999:
232). The question thus arises what reality such
an irrelational self-manifestation has for us as
intentional beings (Seyler, 2012: 98). Put
differently, what is the relationship between
(post-phenomenological) appearance and (phe-
nomenological) intentionality?
I argue that phenomenology itself, as out-
lined in section II, can give an account of this
relationship and hence of the affective phenom-
ena of interest to human geography, such as ‘the
specific affective phenomenality produced by
[ . . . ] technological interventions’ (Ash and
Simpson, 2016: 55) or the phenomenality of
vulnerability, of passive bodies, such as sleep-
ing or comfortable ones (Ash and Simpson,
2016: 56). Rather than going beyond intention-
ality, phenomenology can account for affective
phenomena as intentional and correlational
while endorsing post-phenomenology’s call to
conceive of intentionality as an emergent
relation.
Herein a first instance, I depart from the post-
phenomenological account of intentionality
identified by Ash and Simpson, whereby
intentionality
relates to the proposition that an experience is an
experience of something–we are always looking
at something, listening to something, thinking
about something, and so on. This ‘aboutness’
implicates the presence of an intentional subject
in advance of experience. For experience to be
‘about’ something, there has to be an author of
this aboutness and a point from which the direct-
edness of the experience comes. This notion of
intentionality is then closely tied to a particular
conception of subjectivity whereby the subject
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governs through ‘internal representational
thought’ (Rose, 2006: 546). (Ash and Simpson,
2016: 53, emphasis mine)
A potential point of departure with this
account is the authoriality here ascribed to the
intentional subject, the ‘erroneous subjectiviz-
ing of intentionality’ (Heidegger, 1982 [1975]:
63–64, emphasis in original; see also Pickles,
1985: 71–72; concerning intentionality without
representationalism, see also Drummond,
2012). As Kinkaid critically points out with
respect to post-phenomenological construals
of intentionality more broadly: this ‘is the
moment in which ‘intentionality’ morphs, with-
out explanation, into “intentional subject”’
(Kinkaid, 2020a: 9); it ‘remains unclear what
this subject has to do with phenomenology and
the concept of intentionality’ (Kinkaid, 2020a:
9).
While phenomenologists would agree that
subjectivity plays some role in intentionality,
they would disagree that the subject or subjec-
tivity in general is the ‘intentional author’ of
intentionality (for a more detailed account of
phenomenological approaches to subjectivity
and their relation to post-phenomenology, see
also Kinkaid, 2020a). As Dörfler and Rothfuß
(2018: 100) note, subjectivity is neither impo-
tent nor omnipotent. We are always both actors
[Akteure] and pathors2 [Patheure] (Hasse, 2015:
13), patients [Patienten] and respondents
[Respondenten] of/to experience (Waldenfels,
2011 [2006]: 27–28; concerning the passivity
of subjectivity, see also Hannah, 2019: 60–63;
Waldenfels, 2004). Indeed, as Zahavi’s exposi-
tion of intentionality highlighted, conceiving of
the phenomenological subject in intentionality
as somehow governed by subjectivity would
misrepresent the very nature of intentionality
as the correlation between subject-object,
mind-world; intentionality is irreducible to
either ‘end’ of the correlation.
Returning to the question of affectivity, one
canonical example of a non-representational
and non-authorial phenomenological account
of intentionality can be found in Martin Heideg-
ger’s Being and Time, where he gives a detailed
account of affectivity under the headings of
attunement [Befindlichkeit] and mood [Stim-
mung]. As Heidegger notes, moods have the
disquieting characteristic of arising in such a
way that one ‘does not know why’ (Heidegger,
2010 [1927]: 127, emphasis in original) they
have arisen. We ‘cannot know why because the
possibilities of disclosure belonging to cogni-
tion fall short of the primordial disclosure of
moods’ (Heidegger, 2010 [1927]: 127; see also
Throop, 2018: 202), that is, any attempt to cog-
nitively understand from where a mood arose
comes too late because any cognition already
takes place within a mood. Far from governing
moods as an intentional subject, Heidegger uses
moods to introduce his concept of ‘thrownness’
(Heidegger, 2010 [1927]: 127); moods exem-
plify that we do not author our experiences, but
are rather ‘delivered over’ (Heidegger, 2010
[1927]: 127) to them.
Still, Heidegger’s account of moods remains
correlationist: he accounts for moods not as
lying somewhere beyond intentional experi-
ence, but rather as inextricably caught up with
intentionality itself. Moods are not given to us in
this intentional relation through internal repre-
sentational thought, through the ‘mode of look-
ing’ (Heidegger, 2010 [1927]: 128), but rather
through ‘turning toward or away’ (Heidegger,
2010 [1927]: 128) to or from different moods.
Moods are given to us in the mode of correlation
while still exhibiting the ‘inexorability of an
enigma’ (Heidegger, 2010 [1927]: 128). That
moods have this enigmatic or mysterious char-
acter to them does not lead Heidegger to aban-
don correlationism as the descriptive bedrock of
his account, but rather to develop a more
nuanced account. As moods show, the inten-
tional subject is not necessarily given in
advance of experience. It is through moods that
anything comes to matter to us, that we come to
find ourselves in the world. Mattering itself is
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‘grounded in attunement’ (Heidegger, 2010
[1927]: 129). Far from being authored by an
intentional subject, moods correlationally
author experiences of intentional subjects by
making things matter to said subjects.3
Heidegger’s principal claim concerning
moods is not that they merely can be accounted
for phenomenologically within a correlationist
framework. Moods are irreducible to either the
‘subject-’ or ‘object-pole’ of intentionality,
because they themselves correlate subject and
object in distinctive ways. This is what it means
for moods to be correlational.
Answering to one of the two aims of post-
phenomenology I discuss here, conceiving of
affect as correlational allows one to give an
account of the emergence of intentionality
through attunement. Moods, correlationally
conceived, occur ‘beyond, around, and along-
side the formation of subjectivity’ (Anderson,
2009: 77).
2 Objects (and Their Autonomous
Existence)
According to Ash and Simpson, a ‘post-
phenomenological geography argues for a rein-
vigorated account of objects and suggests that
objects present a starting point for analysis’
(Ash and Simpson, 2016: 59). Following theo-
retical developments from within object-
oriented ontology (Harman, 2018; Morton,
2011), ‘post-phenomenology allows us to con-
sider how objects have capacities for relation
that humanistic forms of phenomenology would
only assign to human beings’ (Ash and Simp-
son, 2016: 59). Taking the ‘autonomy of objects
seriously’ allows post-phenomenology ‘to
investigate relations between non-human
objects without reducing these relations to how
they appear to human beings’ (Ash and Simp-
son, 2016: 59).
How may the phenomenologist respond to
taking objects as a starting point for analysis?
As Zahavi’s exposition of intentionality already
pointed to, starting from objects does not con-
tradict the phenomenological method, yet phe-
nomenology cannot start from either subject or
object in isolation from the other. Phenomenol-
ogy cannot investigate objects apart from inten-
tionality, that is, ‘completely divorced from any
context of use, network of meaning, or theore-
tical framework’, because, to the phenomenol-
ogist, ‘the very idea of such a view is
nonsensical’ (Zahavi, 2018: 28, emphasis mine;
for a detailed phenomenological critique of
speculative realism and object-oriented ontol-
ogy, see also Zahavi, 2016). Conversely, as
Meillassoux himself notes in his account of cor-
relationism, we ‘can never grasp a subject that
would not always-already be related to an
object’ (Meillassoux, 2008 [2006]: 5).
Although this approach may hence not be
successful in breaking free from the ‘correla-
tionist circle’, it is successful – as I will show –
in accomplishing post-phenomenology’s goal to
understand how human capacities, relations and
experiences are not authored by subjects, but
shaped by objects.
In order to show how phenomenology may
take into account the autonomy of objects from
within a correlationist framework, I first turn to
another affect of interest to post-phenomenology:
comfort (Ash and Simpson, 2016: 56).
Although David Bissell (2008), in his paper
on ‘Comfortable bodies: sedentary affects’,
does not coat his analysis in phenomenological
language, it aligns itself well with a phenomen-
ological approach. In his account of sitting, Bis-
sell shows that comfort ‘as an affective
relationality between bodies and objects must
consider the way in which the chair also acts
on the body, thus mediating the nature of affect
experienced through the body’ (Bissell, 2008:
1705). As the above discussion of Heidegger’s
theory of attunement and moods brought to
light, affectivity is irreducible to either ‘subject’
or ‘object’, because affectivity itself correlates
subject and object in distinctive ways. I suggest
that ‘affective relationality between bodies and
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objects’ is a different way to phrase a distinctive
correlation between subject and object. Comfort
too correlates subject and object in particular
ways.
A correlational account of comfort can fol-
low the model of other paradigmatic correla-
tionist accounts from phenomenology, such as
phenomenological accounts of (object-)percep-
tion. Similar to how we seek a position of opti-
mal comfort when sitting, Edmund Husserl
shows in his lectures on Thing and Space that
in perception we also seek the best possible per-
spective from which an object can be seen, what
he coins ‘maximum points’ (Husserl, 1997
[1907]: §36, 106). Husserl points out that ‘we
need to speak naturally not of a single maximum
point but instead of a correlated group or sphere
of maximum points’ (Husserl, 1997 [1907]: §36,
106, emphasis mine). According to Husserl,
there is not a single perspective from which a
given object can be seen best. Rather, whichever
perspective is best is a correlate of (i) the per-
ceiver, (ii) the conditions of perception and (iii)
what is of interest concerning the object of per-
ception (for a detailed discussion of Husserl’s
approach to interest and attention, see also Han-
nah, 2019: 48–54).
Although a large object, such as a tall statue,
can only be seen in its entirety from afar, I may
be more interested in some detail or texture of
the statue, shifting the point of maximum given-
ness ever closer to it. Equally, although a very
bright day may be preferable to see the statue in
its entirety, certain elements of the statue may
go unnoticed, as shadows cannot trace the sta-
tue’s finer details. Getting tired, I may prefer to
view the statue from afar, taking in it and its
surroundings in an almost unfocused gaze. I
may finally be too tired to lift my head long
enough to take in such a scene and instead opt
to sit next to the statue leaning against it, resting
my eyes on some minute detail. Falling asleep, I
then experience the heat of the day as an after-
glow through the warmth of the statue’s stone.
As this example shows, the ‘maximum
points’ in perception are innumerable, but not
arbitrary; phenomenological correlations are
not amalgamations, but rather have certain
structures which can be systematically articu-
lated. This emphasis on the structure of correla-
tion gives correlationist accounts their
explanatory and critical purchase.
Returning to the question of object-
perception, although the subject’s state/position
may play an important role in such experiences,
this does not entail that the subject authors these
perceptions. More often than not, the intentional
subject reaches its authorial limits in the condi-
tions or the object of perception and, in a rever-
sal of authoriality, is ‘authored’ by them.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty (2012 [1945]) offers
a related account of perception in his Phenom-
enology of Perception, but places greater
emphasis on the role of the object.4 ‘For each
object’, he argues, ‘there is an optimal distance
from which it asks to be seen – an orientation
through which it presents more of itself –
beneath or beyond which we merely have a con-
fused perception due to excess or lack’
(Merleau-Ponty, 2012 [1945]: 316, emphasis
mine). The shifting distances between subject
and object in perception, and the varying
degrees of clarity that result from such shifts,
resemble ‘a tension that oscillates around a
norm’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2012 [1945]: 316); a
tension (or correlation) that is sustained by the
subject, the conditions of perception and the
object of perception. Here, the purported
authoriality of the subject is undermined by the
object dictating the distance from which it
‘wants’ to/can be seen. As Sara Ahmed notes,
‘if consciousness is intentional, then we are not
only directed toward objects, but those objects
also take us in a certain direction’ (Ahmed,
2006: 545, emphasis mine).
Merleau-Ponty goes on to describe how
another, more inconspicuous non-human parti-
cipant holds sway over both subject and object
in perception: ‘The lighting directs my gaze and
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leads me to see the object, so in one sense it
knows and sees the object’ (Merleau-Ponty,
2012 [1945]: 323, emphasis mine). Our ‘own
vision’, Merleau-Ponty explains, simply fol-
lows the ‘phosphorescence’ (Lingis, 1968: xlii)
of the world, ‘the pathways traced out for it by
the lighting, just as in hearing a phrase we are
surprised to find the trace of an external thought.
We perceive according to light, just as in verbal
communication we think according to others’
(Merleau-Ponty, 2012 [1945]: 323).
The ‘certain manner that we have of receiv-
ing’ object and lighting in perception has its
counterpart in the ‘certain manner that the out-
side has of invading us’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2012
[1945]: 331, emphasis mine). Merleau-Ponty
emphasises that objects here play the role of
constituting our very perceptual capabilities,
given that ‘we only grasp the unity of our body
in the unity of the thing, and only by beginning
with things do our hands, our eyes, and all of our
sense organs appear to us as interchangeable
instruments’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2012 [1945]:
336). Objects author not only individual experi-
ences, but the very way we relate to the world.
The things we perceive, Merleau-Ponty later
writes in a striking reversal of authoriality, are
‘much more than a correlative of my vision’ as
they impose ‘my vision upon me as a continua-
tion of [their] own sovereign existence’
(Merleau-Ponty, 1968 [1964]: 131, see also
146); a sovereign existence that is nonetheless
given correlationally in experience as that
which withdraws itself from immediate percep-
tion or understanding.
As Kinkaid aptly points out in their defence of
Merleau-Ponty against post-phenomenological
misconstruals, ‘this attention to objects, their
agency in shaping worlds, and their existence
beyond human perception [of import to post-
phenomenology, MH] is not really at odds with
classical phenomenology’s aims’ (Kinkaid,
2020a: 7; see also Anderson and Wylie, 2009:
323–325; Wylie, 2006: 522–527).
Bringing this brief analysis of the role objects
play in correlationist accounts of perception
back to its starting point, comfort too can be
analysed as a correlated group or sphere of
‘maximum points’ of comfort, which are held
in tension by subject, object and the conditions
of experience. Where we find comfort when
sitting depends on (i) the state of our bodies, for
example, being alert or tired, (ii) the conditions
in which we are trying to get comfortable, for
example, meteorological/atmospheric (Hitch-
ings, 2011, 2016) or social conditions (Bissell,
2008: 1704), and finally (iii) the materiality of
the chairs themselves, inviting dwelling or tran-
sience (Bissell, 2008: 1705).
Comfort here highlights an aspect of the cor-
relational nature of experience which is more
difficult to bring to the fore in the case of per-
ception: experience has an immersive effect,
whereby we overlook the fact that subject and
object are not simply given in experience, but
correlated in distinct ways (for a phenomenolo-
gical account of experiences that interrupt
immersion, see also Ahmed, 2006; Allen and
Hosseinnia, 2018; Hannah, 2019; Norwood,
2018). That we do not distinguish between the
different correlational aspects of comfort in
experience (when we are comfortable) is
grounded in the fact that the very correlational
staging or enactment of comfort subverts our
cognition (on staging and enacting space, see
Hasse, 2015: 14; see also Shove, 2003).
Similar to perception, the moments where,
when and how we are comfortable are innumer-
able, but not arbitrary; they reveal certain struc-
tures. Comfort is enacted through correlational
rules, which are uncovered as we (phenomeno-
logically) analyse the relations between bodies,
circumstances and objects. Reflecting on such
rules brings to light how certain spaces and
objects are engineered to make certain bodies
more comfortable than others, as Bissell’s
account shows, and hence enables us to address
and change these rules, revealing phenomenol-
ogy’s critical potential (on critical
Hepach 9
phenomenology, see also Kinkaid, 2020a,
2020b; Mattingly, 2019; Simonsen, 2013).
In short, as with Heidegger’s moods, com-
fort appears to be inherently correlational. A
phenomenological account teaches us that it
would be false to assume that comfort is a
single definite state, a property an object can
simply have. Far from such rigidity, a corre-
lative understanding of comfort allows one to
reflect on the ‘multifaceted and multilayered
scaffold’ (Zahavi, 2018: 20) of subject,
object and circumstance in experience. Enga-
ging in phenomenological inquiry in such a
way allows one ‘to open up, in short, new
possibilities for thinking by means of our
concrete encounters with others, objects,
situations, events, and the world’ (Throop,
2018: 201). Following such concrete encoun-
ters, a correlationist approach to the auton-
omy of objects would seek to explicate how
objects withdraw from and shape our experi-
ences and existence.
3 Doing (Post-)Phenomenology?
By way of summarising what has been dis-
cussed so far, I want to suggest that one may
turn to phenomenology in order to see ‘how
post-phenomenology might be practiced’ (Ash
and Simpson, 2019: 140). The correlational
analysis of moods, perception and comfort
sketched out above bears some resemblance to
the ‘postphenomenological style of analysis’,
which calls for ‘an orientation for research that
lays emphasis on the coconstituted nature of our
being in the world and the need for a more thor-
oughgoing acknowledgment of, and attempt at,
understanding this’ (Ash and Simpson, 2019:
140).
If Ash and Simpson ‘define a postphenome-
nological style as a matter of learning to expli-
citly attend to the various shifting expressions of
objects and how those expressions contribute to
how a situation works’ (Ash and Simpson,
2019: 144), then such a style can also be called
an analysis of intentional experience, if the only
access we have to the ‘expressions of objects’ is
through (actual or imagined) experiences about
objects.
If ‘a postphenomenological writing style is
about creating languages and vocabularies that
establish connections between previously
unconnected things and, through this connect-
ing, generates new ways of thinking, seeing, and
feeling such things’ (Ash and Simpson, 2019:
145), then such a process may be understood as
a continuous phenomenological variation of
intentional structures, that is, a reflection on the
different possible ways in which things may be
given in experience.
The two post-phenomenological styles Ash
and Simpson explicitly suggest – allure and
resonance – equally go together well with the
above brief discussion of the phenomenology of
moods, perception and comfort. Ash and Simp-
son write
We have chosen to focus on the combination of
allure and resonance for a number of reasons.
First, these styles reflect the core tenets of a post-
phenomenological approach: an emphasis on
objects and how they appear, while remaining
excessive of these appearances (allure) and the
moments of encounter and translation when these
objects collide with human sense and change both
objects and humans in the process (resonance).
Second, both of these styles point to a way of
accounting for human sense without reducing
objects to the way they appear to human sense.
In other words, the allure and resonance of objects
are not human interpretations of these phenom-
ena. (Ash and Simpson, 2019: 146, emphasis
mine)
As my short discussion of moods, perception
and comfort has shown, every object of inten-
tional experience shapes and remains excessive
of experience. Allure is constitutive of inten-
tionality as it incessantly guides our experience
beyond what is momentarily given (see also
Bower, 2017).5
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Correlationism, finally, functions as a condi-
tion for the possibility of resonance: Only
through the inseparable entanglement of the
human and non-human in intentionality can
resonance take place as a process in which both
are co-constitutive without being reducible to
each other. Through a phenomenological anal-
ysis of moods, perception and comfort, allure
and resonance come to the fore as basic facts
of intentional experience (see also Husserl,
2001 [1966]: §32–35; Throop, 2018: 203). In
light of this, calling for the ‘end of phenomen-
ology as a philosophy’ (Ash and Simpson, 2019:
142; Sparrow, 2014) or as a geographical meth-
odology appears premature (see also Zahavi,
2016).
IV Entangled Phenomenologies
I have argued above how a phenomenologist
might respond to certain challenges raised by
post-phenomenology not by abandoning corre-
lationism, but by embracing it. By emphasising
the correlated and hence entangled nature of
experience, phenomenology, as I lay it out here,
casts a light on how experience and our under-
standing in general is irreducible to subjects or
objects. Correlationist accounts, I argue, hold
these different aspects of any given experi-
ence/correlation in suspense, in a tension that
cannot be resolved in favour of any single
aspect. Correlationism mediates between nouns
(subjects and objects) and verbs (agencies, rela-
tions and doings), which constitute central
themes of different theoretical approaches in
human geography.6
Situating this phenomenological approach in
the longer history of phenomenological
research in human geography, it runs counter
or orthogonal to both geographical phenomen-
ology and phenomenological geography, as
identified by John Pickles (1985; see also
Rehorick, 1991). On the one hand, I reaffirm
Pickles’ critique of ‘humanistic’ interpretations
of phenomenology in geography –
‘geographical phenomenology’ (Pickles, 1985:
5–11) – in that I too am critical of subjectivist
approaches. On the other hand, I question
Pickles’ own Heideggerian approach – phenom-
enological geography – to ground geography as
a science in an architecture of regional ontolo-
gical structures (Pickles, 1985: 169).
I here follow Bernhard Waldenfels’ critique
of both Husserl and Heidegger, in which he
emphasises that experiences of alterity must
lead us to question the idea of such ontological
architectures that ground and prefigure experi-
ence and existence. Reflecting on the nature of
intentionality, Waldenfels notes there is a ‘sig-
nificative difference’ [signifikative Differenz]
(Waldenfels, 1997: 19, translation mine)
between what is experienced and how it is
experienced which allows us to experience
something as something. Put differently, inten-
tionality most simply means that something
appears ‘this way and not differently’ (Walden-
fels, 1997: 20, translation mine). Reflecting on
this basic fact of intentionality, one realises that
the very structure of intentionality is porous
(Merleau-Ponty, 1968 [1964]: 149), always
already exposed and ‘entangled in a heteroge-
neous logic of difference’ (Anderson and Wylie,
2009: 319, emphasis mine).
Instead of an ontological architecture, instead
of ‘traditional sphere or layer models’ (Walden-
fels, 1997: 68, translation mine) of reality where
an authorial subject radiates out from some cen-
tre, Waldenfels suggests the figure of thought of
entanglement [Denkfigur der Verschränkung],
in which ownness and otherness are more or less
intertwined, ‘like a net which can be loosened or
fastened’ (Waldenfels, 1997: 67, translation
mine).
Of crucial importance is the methodological
imperative that results from entanglement:
‘Like in the case of ribbon or thread patterns,
[ . . . ] the disentanglement of the intertwined
elements and lines leads to the destruction of
the pattern, which stands and falls with this
intertwining’ (Waldenfels, 1997: 67–68,
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translation mine; on patterned stabilities, see
also McCormack, 2017, 2018: 28). It is this pat-
tern that is at risk of being effaced in post-
phenomenological accounts; accounting for this
pattern requires a more gentle approach (Pottin-
ger, 2020). Highlighting entangled phenomen-
ologies, as I do throughout this article,
emphasises that one cannot disentangle the
human from the non-human without destroying
the very pattern that shows our inherent inter-
twinement with that which is other/more-than-/
non-human.
By way of concluding, I outline one last phe-
nomenological approach to preserving the pat-
terned nature experience and existence which
holds much potential for future geographical
research: Günter Figal’s (2010, 2015, 2019)
phenomenology of spatiality.
1 Spatial Phenomenology
Figal sets out his account of the phenomenology
of spatiality by asking a question that has reoc-
cured in different forms throughout the argu-
ments above: How is it that we do not
experience the phenomenality of experience
itself, that is, how phenomena are distinct cor-
relations of subject and object, but rather appear
to experience ourselves and objects as (indepen-
dently) given, as (more or less simple and sep-
arate) facts of experience (Figal, 2016: §4, 58)?
It is this question, Figal argues, that Husserl,
Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty faced in different
ways7: How does one account for the fact that
phenomena are at once unified in experience
and differentiated into subject and object as cor-
relates of experience (Figal, 2016: §4, 59)? It is
a misunderstanding of this problem, as I argued
above, that leads to the post-phenomenological
claim that phenomenologists unilaterally
resolve this tension between unity and differ-
ence in favour of an authorial subject. Accord-
ing to Figal, however, the ‘exclusivity of
phenomenology over all other possible ways
to relate in and to the world’ (Figal, 2016: §4,
60, translation mine) is that it reflects upon and
articulates this very tension.
Figal’s own answer to this question is to
account for the correlation between subject and
object spatially. As numerous examples
above have shown, what is given in experience
transcends experience in distinct ways. Conse-
quently, a condition of possibility of experience
is that what we experience is set apart, at a dis-
tance (Figal, 2016: §4, 73). The correlation
between subject and object, Figal concludes, is
hence a ‘possibility of space’ (Figal, 2016: §4,
73, translation mine).
Figal goes on to distinguish three basic char-
acteristics of the spatiality of experience that
govern both subject and object of experience:
Everything perceived has (i) its place, where it is
(ii) open to be experienced (iii) at a distance
from others (Figal, 2016: §5, 76). Perception
itself is spatial in that what I perceive is (i) there
and not here, from where I perceive, my percep-
tion is (ii) open in that it is not fixated on a single
object or way of perceiving and (iii) the object
of my perception always remains at a distance
no matter how near I draw (Figal, 2016: §5, 76).
The crucial point that follows from this
account is that spatiality itself, governing both
subject and object, is what guarantees the coher-
ency of subject and object in experience while
allowing them to be set apart; ‘the unity of phe-
nomena is only possible as a spatial [unity]’
(Figal, 2016: §5, 77, translation mine).
Returning back to the questions raised above,
Figal answers that this spatiality at the heart of
all experience is not experienced as such
because we always already experience objects
as admitted somewhere, open to experience and
distanced from us without considering admitt-
edness, openness and distantness itself (Figal,
2016: §5, 84).
2 The ‘Great Outdoors’?
Figal’s spatial approach provides a novel
answer to the problem of the ‘great outdoors’
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(Meillassoux, 2008 [2006]: 50; Ash and Simp-
son, 2016: 63) posed by post-phenomenologists,
that is, that we have to break free from the ‘cor-
relationist circle’ in order to uncover what/how
things ‘really are’. Positing spatiality as the con-
dition of possibility of correlationism turns the
distinction between (subjective) inside and
(objective) outside on its head:
Oneself, as the living being that one is, cannot be
an Inside; for that to be the case one would have to
be able to be “inside oneself”, and then one would
be a space/room for oneself. But oneself is, seen
from the position of oneself, always outside, in an
Outside that does not stand in opposition to an
Inside – in the limitless Outside. (Figal, 2016:
§13, 211, translation mine)
The Outside Figal outlines here is the outside
in which both subject and object coincide in
experience; the spatiality that coheres subject
and object.
Conceiving of correlationism in such a way
addresses the post-phenomenological concern
that intentionality (purportedly) covers up ‘the
idea that sensibility may take place as a relation
with an exterior, may be composed from the
outside, through and as a passive exposure’
(Harrison, 2008: 430).
As the examples above aimed to show, inten-
tionality is the very structure that enables us to
recognise the correlated nature of our experi-
ence and existence, allows us to recognise that
we are always already exposed to the Outside.
Here vulnerability, which ‘asks us to think inter-
iority as somehow always already involved with
and turned towards its exterior’ (Harrison, 2008:
436), becomes the default state of experience
and existence (see also Hannah, 2019: 96–
101). Through a reflection on the correlational
nature of experience, ‘I appear to myself com-
pletely turned inside out under my own eyes
(Merleau-Ponty, 1968 [1964]: 143).
The entanglement(s) I have drawn attention
to throughout this piece highlights that we are
never inside ourselves, but always already stand
in a certain correlative relation that lies beyond
the distinction of inside-outside. That ‘the sub-
ject is structured intentionally within itself’
(Heidegger, 1982 [1975]: 60) does not mean
that experiences or thoughts are somehow
trapped ‘within’ us, but rather that the subject
is always already exposed to what is ‘without’.
Experiences are not ‘in consciousness as things
are in a box’ (Husserl, 2010 [1973]: 52). Nor is
‘the great outdoors’ somehow ‘outside the box’.
We should do away with such ‘box-thinking’
altogether (see also Heidegger, 2010 [1927]:
56–57; Merleau-Ponty, 1968 [1964]: 138;
Zahavi, 2018: 23–24). The ‘heavy sense of
interiority so central to the phenomenological
tradition’ (Roberts, 2019: 551) must, I hope to
have shown, be neither central nor heavy.
V Conclusion
So, what promise does phenomenology have
left for human geography? As stated in the
introduction, phenomenology casts light on
how subject and object cohere in experience.
Entangled phenomenologies give accounts of
the different distinct ways in which subject and
object are intertwined. Intentionality and cor-
relationism are the key phenomenological con-
cepts which allow one to clarify the how of
these entanglements.
Concerning the challenge of post-
phenomenology, my discussion of the work of
various phenomenologists (Husserl, Heidegger,
Merleau-Ponty, Waldenfels, Figal and Ahmed)
has shown that phenomenology addresses many
of the questions that are central to the post-
phenomenological project. Mischaracterising
phenomenology as ‘idealist’ or ‘subjectivist’
risks obscuring the potential, the promise that
both past and contemporary phenomenology
holds for understanding our relationship with,
for example, the more-than-/non-human (nota-
ble exceptions include Anderson and Wylie
(2009) and Wylie (2006) on Merleau-Ponty’s
work). Instead of ‘posting’ phenomenology, I
Hepach 13
suggest revisiting core phenomenological ques-
tions concerning the nature of intentionality and
correlationism.
Beyond the narrow debate around post-
phenomenology, reconsidering key phenomen-
ological concepts is of import to human
geography more broadly. As the examples I
have discussed above emphasise, intentionality
and correlationism cast a light on a key problem
that is already discussed in various areas of geo-
graphic research, albeit without the explicit use
of phenomenological concepts: What part do
subjects, objects and circumstances play in par-
ticular experiences and experience in general
(on ‘the circumstantial’, see also McCormack,
2017)? Making use of different phenomenolo-
gical methods and models, such as the ones I
have introduced above, helps draw this inter-
play of correlational entanglement (of concern
to human geographers) out into the open.
Possible areas of application for such an
approach, as detailed above, are geographical
accounts of how affectivity and objects shape
subjectivity itself. Emphasising distinct correla-
tional entanglements, and there-by opening
them up to critique, is a method which is already
being practiced successfully by critical phe-
nomenologists in human geography (Kinkaid,
2020a, 2020b; Revill, 2016; Simonsen, 2013)
and beyond (Mattingly, 2019; Weiss et al.,
2019). Drawing on the work of past and con-
temporary phenomenologists, Hannah has
recently developed a phenomenological
account of embodied directedness, redressing
‘a characteristic lacuna of much socio-spatial
theory and philosophy’ (Hannah, 2019: 87).
In my view, Figal’s spatial phenomenology
holds particular promise for geography, renew-
ing a spatial understanding of geography as
‘chorology’ (Sauer, 1925: 20). In spatial phe-
nomenology, space no longer only describes the
‘subjective’ space of lived experience, nor
‘objective’ extended Cartesian space, but rather
the very way subject and object cohere in expe-
rience. What may at first seem like a
fantastically abstract approach promises unique
insights into the nature of landscape (following
Wylie, 2006), weather (following Ingold, 2005,
2007, 2010; Hepach, 2017) or climate (follow-
ing Hulme, 2017; Johnson, 2019), accounting
for each of these phenomena as neither subjec-
tive nor objective, but rather as cohering our
experience and existence in distinct ways. With
the help of spatial phenomenology, one may
grasp how we are entangled in various ‘elemen-
tal milieu[s]’ (McCormack, 2018: 20), and what
far-reaching existential consequences we might
expect from changes in these milieus in the face
of climate or other environmental change.
Through the lens of entangled phenomenolo-
gies, such changes spell a shift in the very com-
prehensibility of our world. In short, the
promise of phenomenology for human geogra-
phy lies in bringing to light the entangled nature
of experience and existence at a decisive
moment.
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Notes
1. Throughout this article, I follow the assessment of both
Ash and Simpson (2016) and Kinkaid (2020a) that
although post-phenomenology is still an ‘emerging
paradigm that, as of yet, admittedly lacks coherence
and a stable reference point’ (Kinkaid, 2020a: 2), the
heterogeneous approaches to post-phenomenology
nonetheless coincide in their critique of central phe-
nomenological concepts, such as intentionality (Harri-
son, 2008: 430; Lea, 2009: 375; Roberts, 2019: 545–
546; Rossetto, 2019: 131; Wylie, 2006: 525).
2. Pathor [Patheur] is a technical term introduced by Hasse
to describe a certain form of subjectivity. Whereas an
actor is defined by their ability to be proactive, a pathor is
defined by their inability to be proactive. Instead of act-
ing, a pathor (from the Ancient Greek pathos) passively
experiences or suffers through events.
3. This account of moods bridges the gap between two
different understandings of affect identified by Ben
Anderson. On the one hand, moods are similar to affects
understood ‘as intensive “capacities to affect and be
affected”’ (Anderson, 2016: 735; see also McCormack,
2003). On the other hand, they resemble the ‘ways in
which things become significant and relations are
lived’, which Anderson identifies as the common char-
acteristic of ‘pragmatic-contextual translations of the
term “affect”’ (Anderson, 2016: 735, see also 2014).
4. I would like to thank one anonymous reviewer for sug-
gesting I include Merleau-Ponty’s work in my account.
5. As Hannah (2019: 60–63) argues, phenomenological
accounts of attention highlight that the way we become
aware of both ‘internal’ thoughts and feelings and
‘external’ objects is best accounted for by describing
how our objects of attention become obtrusive in such a
way that they elicit a response from us, underscoring
the primordial passivity of attention that calls into ques-
tion once more the authoriality of subjectivity even ‘in
its own home’. Subjectivity here is ‘characterised by
“directional asymmetry”‘, in that we ‘are constantly
“open” to appeals, desires, impulses and solicitations
[to the alluring, MH] from all directions, both internal
and external, but largely only able to act in a sustained
and deliberate way in a directionally limited fashion’
(Hannah, 2019: 2).
6. I would like to thank one anonymous reviewer for this
insight.
7. Figal’s approach might be viewed as an alternative to
the ‘lingering humanism’ (Ash and Simpson, 2016: 56)
in Merleau-Ponty’s late work on the concept of flesh –
‘an ongoing, originary, process of intertwining and
separation’ (Anderson and Wylie, 2009: 324)
‘between’ subject and object –, which has received
much attention across phenomenology and post-
phenomenology (Kinkaid, 2020a; Simonsen, 2013;
Wylie, 2006).
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